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Summary findings
Wane develops a general model for addressing the  In his model, the optimal compensation scheme must
question of how to compensate tax inspectors in an  take into account the strategic interaction between
economy where corruption is pervasive-a  model that  taxpayers and tax inspectors:
considers the existence of strategic transmission of  *  Pure "tax farming" (paying tax inspectors a share of
information.  their tax collections) is optimal only when all tax
Most of the literature on corruption  assumes that the  inspectors are corruptible.
taxpayer  and the tax inspector jointly decide on the  *  When there are both honest and corruptible
income to report,  which also determines the size of the  inspectors, the optimal compensation scheme lies
bribe. In contrast, Wane's model considers the more  between pure tax farming and a pure wage scheme.
realistic case in which the taxpayer unilaterally chooses  *  Paradoxically, when inspectors are hired
the income to report.  The tax inspector cannot change  beforehand,  it may be optimal to offer contracts that
the report and is faced with a binary choice: either he  attract corruptible inspectors but not honest ones.
negotiates the bribe on the basis of the income report or
he denounces the tax evader and therefore  renounces the
bribe.
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The treatment  of tax  evasion in the tax  compliance literature  dates back at least  to the  classic
paper of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). The tax administration needs to design an audit strategy
in order to deter  or reduce evasion.  Audits that  allow to disclose true,  as opposed to  reported,
incomes are  then  carried  out  by agents whose objectives are  assumed  to  be  in  line with  the
goals of the  tax  administration.  This however overlooks the  role of utility-maximizing  agents,
whose objectives may conflict with that  of the  administration.  Such agents can and  may  side-
contract with citizens to evade tax payments. In fact, in a hierarchical structure where a principal
delegates a task to an agent along with some discretion over certain decisions, there is much room
for collusion.
One of the first attempts  to formalize collusion in a hierarchy using the principal-agent frame-
work can be found in Tirole (1986). Since then, a large corruption and tax administration literature
has emerged. Chander and Wilde (1992) generalize the tax  evasion paper  of Graetz et al.  (1986)
by taking  into account the  possibility of collusion between a  tax  evader and  an official auditor
whose cost of dishonesty is (relatively) low. In their a two-class economy only high-income indi-
viduals have the possibility to evade. It  all begins when taxpayers  send required income reports
to the  tax  agency, which opens the  door to strategic  transmission of information.  Chander  and
Wilde  (1992), however, do not  address the  problem of optimal remuneration  of the  inspectors.
This problem is dealt with by Besley and McLaren (1993), Hindriks et al. (1999), and Mookherjee
and Png (1995) in different contexts.
Besley and  McLaren (1993) compare  three distinct  remuneration  schemes, that  provide dif-
ferent  incentives to the  inspectors.  They characterize  the  conditions under which each scheme
generates  the  greatest  amount  of tax  revenues net  of administration  costs.  They consider in a
simple model the existence of honest as well as dishonest inspectors and taxpayers. The presence
of different types  of auditors  introduces an  adverse selection dimension.  However, even though
1monitoring  is costly, there is no moral hazard problem since it is the principal that  monitors and
exerts costly effort to disclose corruption.  Hindriks et  al.  (1999) consider a model where all the
actors are dishonest.  They however allow for general remuneration schemes and more importantly
for extortion.  Finally, Mookherjee and Png's  (1995) paper,  to which this  one is closely related,
also considers only corruptible agents but they remove the exogenous matching of the auditor  and
the  evader (polluter in their  case) often assumed in the literature.  They consider a moral hazard
problem since for evasion to be disclosed the inspector has to exert a costly nonobservable effort.
Our model distinguishes itself from the models cited above in several respects.  Like Chander
and  Wilde (1992), we consider the existence of strategic information transmission, but  use a more
general model with a continuum of possible incomes. In most of the literature  on corruption, the
bribe the evader pays the inspector is the solution of a Nash bargain and the parties agree to report
the  income that  maximizes their joint profit. In contrast to the  literature, in this  model, the tax
evader chooses unilaterally the amount to evade. Therefore, the report may be different from the
one that  maximizes the joint expected profit. We also allow for both moral hazard as in Mookherjee
and Png and adverse selection as in Besley and McLaren. General remuneration schemes ranging
from pure tax-farming to pure wage systems are also allowed. Finally, corruption is considered to
be structural,  i.e., given a weak judiciary system and mild punishments for corruption or evasion,
collusion is always beneficial.  This assumption fits well with  the  situation  in many developing
countries.  This paper  investigates the  remuneration  contract that  maxinizes  the  tax  receipts of
the  administration  in an environment with structural  corruption.  The tax  and penalty  systems
are set  up by the social planner,  while the tax  administration  has total discretion over the  form
of the contracts  it proposes to its employees.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the different actors of the
model. Section 2.1 models the relationship between the  auditors and the taxpayers  as a signaling
game.  Section 3 solves the  model, first in the  case where all inspectors are  identical and second
when they differ. Section 4 considers the implications of different extensions of the model. Section
25 concludes.
2  The  general  setting
Consider an economy with a continuum of taxpayers  endowed with exogenous incomes on which
taxes must be paid. The distribution of income in the economy is common knowledge and denoted
f (0) on the  support e = [a, ]; however, a particular  taxpayer's income is private information and
can be observed only through  costly audits.  Therefore, taxpayers  may misreport  their  income.
Tax compliance is enforced by the  tax  agency, the  fund-raising arm of the  government, which is
composed of tax inspectors (or auditors) that review the taxpayers' reports.  An auditor is assigned
the task  of detecting attempted  fraud and denouncing the evaders in exchange for remuneration
determined  by the tax  agency. In order to discover cheaters, the  auditors  need to exert a costly
nonobservable effort.  Moreover, some may  pursue their  own agenda  and  be prone  to bribery.
Subsequent to a side-contract between a taxpayer and  an inspector, an additional audit  can take
place with a given exogenous probability.  This audit will reveal the true  income of the taxpayer
and whether  corruption  occurred or not,  with the  agents fined accordingly. The taxpayers  and
inspectors are risk-neutral and the tax agency aims at maximizing its revenue. Let us now provide
a more formal description of the different actors of the  economy and their  interactions.
The government,  as a  passive actor,  determines the  environment in which the  tax  agency,
taxpayers, and  inspectors evolve. This environment consists of the tax  and  penalty  system given
by the  following triplet  (T, O.a, t), where T  is the  tax  function and T(0)  represents the  amount
of tax  an individual who reports  an  income 0 and  has not been proven to earn  another income
will have to pay; Xi for i = a, t represent the  fine functions where a stands  for auditor  and t for
taxpayer.  Therefore,  t(0, m)  is the  fine a tax  evader with  income 9 reporting  m must  pay  in
addition to the full tax liability, and 0'a(0,  m)  is the fine owed by the inspector that  shielded the
evader in exchange for a bribe.  The functions display the following properties for i =  a, t:
3(i)  T(O) <  9  and  T'(9)  > 0, (ii)  Oi(9,  m) > 0 for all m, 0, (iii)  i(9, m) is non-decreasing in 0,
(iv)  Oi  (0,  m) is non-increasing in m, (v)  Oi(0,  9) = 0.
Condition (i) states that  tax liabilities cannot exceed income and are nondecreasing with it.  From
condition (ii), over- and under-reporting are both sanctioned, conditions (iii) and  (iv) ensure that
the fines increase as the  distance between true and  reported  incomes widens.  Finally, condition
(v) rules out rewards for truthful  reports.
The tax  agency has complete discretion  over the  remuneration  scheme of the  auditors.  The
payment to inspectors is fully determined  by the  couple (w, 7i)  where w E IR is a fixed wage paid
for every file reviewed and  7 E [0,1] is a commission rate  on a specific file. The tax  agency pays
therefore a salary of w + qT(O) to an inspector that  audits a report of 0. The tax agency's objective
is to maxiniize revenue and it is aware of the possibility for evasion and corruption.  All the reports
confirmed by the  auditors  are verified again with an exogenous probability A (determined  out of
the  model)  and true  income is then  perfectly assessed.  If true  income as revealed by the  audit
is different from the  reported  and  confirmed income, it is possible to distinguish  cases of pure
evasion from those where corruption also took place, i.e., the  auditor  can prove that  no bribery
occurred and that  shirking is the reason for not discovering the true income of the  taxpayer.
Each taxpayer has an exogenous income a  E e which is private information and is sometimnes
referred to  as the taxpayer's  type.  The taxpayer  sends an income report  to the  tax  agency and
aims at  maximizing the  expected payoff such a  report  implies.  A strategy  for a  taxpayer  is a
function
s:39  - M
where m =  s(O) is the report  a taxpayer  sends if 0 is the true income.  In choosing this  strategy,
the taxpayer  also takes into account a possible visit of an inspector who may be either corruptible
or honest.  Such a taxpayer  evades the amount u(9, m) = T(9) - T(m).
The auditor is offered a remuneration  contract  by the  tax  agency for the  collection of taxes.
4The contract  is accepted or rejected by the auditor if its expected payoff is lower than what  can be
obtained elsewhere, i.e., on the reservation utility.  It is assumed that  the  inspector is hired from
a large pool of people, and  that  an exogenous proportion,  /3,  of the  individuals  composing the
pool is prone to corruption.  Because it is impossible to distinguish a corruptible from an honest
inspector, there is an adverse selection problem. Moreover, because an auditor  spends costly and
unobservable effort to investigate a report  in order to discover hard evidence of evasion, there is
also a moral hazard problem. A strategy  for the auditors is a function
ei:M  -*  I=[O,1]fori=h,d
where  e'(m)  is the  level of effort the  auditor  devotes to  a file reporting  an income m,  where h
stands  for honest and d for dishonest.  The effort level is normalized to represent the probability
of discovering the  true  income of the taxpayer.  There is a disutility of effort O(et) in monetary
terms. It is assumed that  ,'  > 0, '6"  > 0, and V)(0)  = 0'(0)  = 0. From the meeting of a corruptible
inspector and an evader, corruption can emerge, the evader paying a bribe to the  inspector who
in turn  confirms the  false report.
The timing of the game is the following:
1.  A move by nature  determines the couple (B, A).
2.  The government announces the tax function T(O), and the fine functions Oi  (9, m) for i = a, t;
3.  The tax  agency then announces the  remuneration scheme (w, ij).
4.  Each taxpayer  sends an income report to the tax  agency.
5.  A corruptible or honest auditor  verifies the  report where income m is declared, forms some
beliefs about the true type of the taxpayer, and devotes an effort et(m) to the file, for i = h, d.
6.  The auditor  and the  taxpayer meet and one of the following  states  of nature  materializes
*  the auditor  fails to discover the taxpayer's  true type and confirms the report;
5*  the agent discovers  the taxpayer's true income 0, negotiates a bribe b(0,  m) and confirms
the report;
* the agent discovers the taxpayer's  true income and announces it to the tax  agency.
7.  For all the confirmed reports,  a move by nature  determines whether or not the  file will be
audited  (with probability A).
2.1  The  auditor-taxpayer  problem
The relationship between the taxpayer and the auditor  concerns stages 4 to 6 of the above timing.
Involving two players, one moving first by sending a message that  conditions the  second player's
action, this  game belongs to the class of signaling games. The taxpayer  (sender) sends a message
(the report)  to the  auditor  (the receiver) whose strategy (the intensity of audit)  depends on this
information.  Thus, there  exists strategic information transmission.
2.1.1  The  signaling  game
The signaling sub-game between the taxpayer and the inspector occurs if and only if the inspector
has accepted the remuneration  contract.1 It can be represented by the following game tree:
(1)~~~~~~~~~~~~5 (1  - (2)  X3  4  6  7
Fig.  1: Game tree for a dishonest taxpayer
Note also this is only one of many files the inspector has to audit. Hence, the inspector plays several games,
one for each file. It is assumed that  these games and the payoffs  they imply are independent.
6The taxpayer's  payoff function is denoted by U(O,  m, eh, ed) and that  of the auditor, for a given
remuneration  contract,  by Vt(9,m, et; w,  7) for i  = h, d. The concept of sequential equilibrium
intioduced  by Kreps and  Wilson (1982) will be used in this  paper.  Attention  will be focused on
the pure strategies sequential equilibria, leaving aside the possibility for the  players to randomize
among different actions.  A sequential equilibrium in our model is given by a reporting  strategy
8*(.)  for the taxpayers  that  is optimal with respect  to the auditors'  strategies  eh*(.), ed*(.)  that
in turn  are optimal to each other  and with respect to the  taxpayers'  strategy,  given the  beliefs
pHh*  (.), pd* ()  the auditors  hold about the taxpayer's  true income. Let us denote by - (0)  the set
of all probability distributions over E3.  The belief function is  : M  '-4  - (e),  where  ti'(01m)  is the
posterior probability, derived from a bayesian updating  process, that  the report m has been sent
by a taxpayer  whose income is 0. For m E M  and pi  E - (0),  let BR'(m,  pi)  be the  set of pure
best responses of the i-auditor  to the message m given the  beliefs ui, i.e.,
BR t(m,  i)-Argmax  V'(0,m,  et;w,  71)A'(6lm)d6  for i =  h,d
eCl Je
Definition  1  An  auditing equilibrium  for  the signaling sub-game is a set of strategies s*for the
taxpayers, eh  and ed for the auditors and beliefs  y*  such that:
(i) VO E e,  s*(0)  E ArgmaxmEM  U(O, m,  eh* (m),  ed*(m));
(ii) Vm E M, et  (m) E BRi(m,  M*),  for i = h, d;
(iii) Vm  E M,  VO E e, p*(OIm) =  f(O)/lf 7 Es 1 (m)f(r)dr,  if the denominator is > 0 and any
distribution otherwise.
Condition  (i) states  that  taxpayers choose reports  that  maximize their  expected payoff given
the audit  strategy  of the  inspectors.  Condition (ii) implies that  the  auditors'  strategies  are best
to that  of the taxpayers given the beliefs they hold.  It also implies a consistency requirement that
both honest and dishonest auditors have the same beliefs in and out of equilibrium. Condition (iii)
gives the beliefs of the  auditors about the type of the taxpayers based on their reports.  The effort
levels exerted  by h- and  d-auditors are  indirectly linked through  the  strategy  of the  taxpayers,
which depends on both efforts. It remains now to make explicit the payoffs  of the different players.
We assume all are risk neutral and thus want to maximize disposable income.
7The honest auditors refuse all bribery by definition. One can imagine that  the  cost they bear
from the  stigma of being caught in corruption is infinite; the value of their integrity is priceless.
Their expected payoff from auditing a report of m  emanating from a 0-taxpayer is
Vh(9,  m, eh; w,q)  = w +±qT(m)  +  t,eh(m)EA[u(9,M)]  - (eh(m)),  ()
which is the  sum of the  salary paid for a report  m  and  the  extra profit  that  accrues when the
auditing effort allows for discovering and denouncing the evader minus the cost of the effort.
The  corruptible  auditors,  on the  contrary,  are  motivated  solely by bribery  whenever it  is
profitable.  They incur no cost from the  stigma of being caught.  However, whenever an evader
offers them a bribe b(9,  m),  they can be audited  and fined afterwards. The expected payoff of the
dishonest auditors is therefore given by
Vd(0, m, ed;  w, i)  = w + 7iT(m) + ed(im)E,[b(9, m)  - AOQ,  (0i m)] - O(ed(M)).  (2)
Their payoff has the same structure  as that  of the honest  auditors  except that  the  reward they
get from auditing equals the  bribe minus the expected value of the fine.
To compute the expected utility of a dishonest 0-taxpayer who reports m,  we need to consider
the game tree given in figure 1.  The payoff at each final node is as follows: (1) =  (6) =  T(m),
(2) = (5) =  (7)=  T(9)+Ot(9,  m), (3) = T(m)+b(O, m) and finally (4) = T(O) +±t(O,m) +b(O,m).
Taldng the  expectation of the different payoffs gives the expected utility
U(H,m; eh, ed)  =  -T(O)+  u(,m)
-[A  + 3(1 -A)eh(M)I(u(0,  im)  + qt (9, m))  -(1  -,3)ed(m)b(O,m).  (3)
With  respect  to a truthful  report,  there is an  expected premium from cheating that  is given by
the  last three terms.  The first one is the  evaded amount saved for sure and enters the  premium
with a  positive sign; the  last two terms  constitute  the  expected disbursement  the  taxpayer  will
suffer, depending on whether the  audit is carried out by a  corruptible or honest auditor  and the
8subsequent  audit, and have a negative sign. A taxpayer's  evasion decision depends on the  sign of
this  premium. Evasion occurs if and only if it is positive.
An important property of the signaling game played by taxpayers and auditors is monotonicity.
Monotonic signaling games constitute  an  important  class of games since many  refinements are
equivalent, i.e., lead to the  same selection of equilibria, in this class as shown by Cho and Sobel
(1990). In a monotonic signaling game, all the senders have the same preferences over the  set of
pure best responses of the receivers. In this game, monotonicity must be considered with respect to
both types of auditors.  The game is clearly monotonic since all taxpayers prefer lower probabilities
of audit  from the honest (resp. dishonest) auditors that  of the dishonest (resp.  honest) ones being
fixed.  Formally, U(O,m;e i,ei)  > U(O,m;e ',ee)  for all B E e and  m E M,  for e'  <  es', and  ei
fixed, for i, j =  h, d and ij.
2.1.2  The  bribery
In the  above signaling game, bribery arises only when a dishonest auditor exerts sufficient effort
to  find evidence of evasion.  The above model differs from earlier contributions  in corruption
because the  taxpayer  is sovereign over the  report  to send.  The auditor  can  only confirm the
report or denounce the evader. Therefore, if the auditor accepts a bribe, the report is not forcefully
maximizing the joint  expected surplus of the players as is usual in the  literature.  This also rules
out the possibility of extortion considered by Hindricks et  al.  (1999). Suppose a 0-taxpayer who
reported  m has been discovered by a corruptible  auditor.  Under which conditions will bribery
emerge, and what is the price to pay for the auditor to confirm the report?  This price is negotiated
by the parties, which are assumed to have identical bargaining powers and adopt the Nash solution.
The threat  point is denouncement in which case the taxpayer pays T(6) +±t (0, m) and the auditor
receives w +  77T(9)  - O(e(m)). If the players agree on corruption, the taxpayer  pays b to the auditor
who confirms the report,  but with a probability A they are again caught and this time fined. The
taxpayer's  expected payment  is therefore (1 - A)T(m) + b + A[T(8) +  bt(m,O)] while the  auditor
9expects to receive w + 77T(m) + b  - AqS(G,  m) - oo(e(m)). By an obvious computation the expected
gains from corruption are obtained as the difference between the agreement and the disagreement
payoffs. The expected gain of the taxpayer is:
Pt(0, m, b) = (1 - A)  [u(8, m) + Ot  (0, m)] -b
and that  of the auditor:
Pa  (0,  m, b)  =  b- AO,,(0, m) -,u(O,  m).
A bribe will be paid if and  only if both players gain from it, i.e., the price is not too high for the
taxpayer  and not too low for the  auditor.  A necessary condition for bribery is thus:
(1-A)[U(Om)+t(SO, im)]>  AOa(e m) +  u(O,  im).  (4)
Throughout  the  paper,  this  condition is  assumed to  hold because the  institutional  setting  is
working so poorly that  agents always find it profitable to engage in bribery.  So the joint expected
profit from corruption is
pe7at =  (1 - A)[u(e, m) + O(B,  m)] - ASa(O, m)  - u(O, m).  (5)
Note that  the bribe does not appear in the formula because it merely redistributes  profit and does
not affect its value.  Moreover, this  value is fixed ex ante by (the choice of) the taxpayer  and the
inspector cannot influence it, or at least influences it only indirectly through the  auditing strategy.
This is in contrast  to most of the literature,  which often assumes that  the  parties jointly decide
on the report  that  maximizes their joint  expected profit.  The discretion of the  taxpayer  over the
report  enables her by the same token to set the amount of the  bribe once the  rules of the  game
are fixed. As already noted, the bribe is bargained A  la Nash and since the bargaining powers are
equal, the  expected gains from bribery are equalized. This gives a bribe equal to
b(9,  m)=  1(  -A + )u(mO,  m) + (  - A)O(, m)  + Aa(,  m)].  (6)
For 9 (resp.  m) fixed, the bribe decreases (resp.  increases) with m (resp.  0). As long as bribery
is profitable,  strengthening  the repression by for instance increasing the  fine functions or raising
10the  salary of the inspector through the variable component 7i, increases the price of the auditor's
silence.  Intuitively,  increasing Ot increases the  cost  the  taxpayer  would support  if denounced;
increasing ika  or 71 makes corruption costlier for the  auditor.  A higher probability  of detection
however decreases the bribe.  Therefore, increasing 'P,  and  q while lowering Ot until  (4) is violated
is the way to stop corruption.  This operation however does not forcefully guarantee  a reduction
in evasion. Indeed, the dishonest taxpayers may still find it rewarding to understate  their income
even if they are certainly punished whenever caught.
2.2  The  tax  agency  problem
The preceding section analyzed the game played by taxpayers  and inspectors assuming the  latter
accepted  the  proposed remuneration  contract.  Since the  tax  agency offers a  take-it or  leave-it
contract  to the auditors, the contract is accepted if its expected payoff is greater than  the outside
opportunity,  denoted V  for i  h, d, of the  auditors.  Each auditor  will have a large number of
reports,  randomly  chosen, to audit. The expected payoff from the contract  is therefore given by:
V(w,  r1)  =  |  V'(0, s(O), e(s());  w, 97)  f (0) dg,  for  i = h, d.  (7)
Once inspectors accept the  contract, the tax  agency expects to collect the following amount from
a 0-taxpayer reporting m
R(w,  i7; 0, m, ed(m), eh(m))  =  (1 - 7j)T(m)-w  + A(1 - 13)ed(m)'oa(9,  m)
+  [A +  P(1  - A)eh(m)] (u(9,  m)  +  Ot(B,  m))  -_f37eh(m)u(9,  m).
This revenue reflects the fact that  the tax agency does not know whether the report will be audited
by a corruptible or honest inspector.  The revenue is determined  at equilibrium and  depends on
the strategies  adopted by the players.  To compute  the total  expected revenue at  equilibrium it
suffices  to integrate over the whole population
1t(ta,q)  =  X(w,7;  0s(O),  el(S(0)),eh(8(0)))f  (O)do1  (8)
11The tax  agency solves the  following  program:
Maximizew,,, 1R(w,  7) subject to  Vh(w, 1) > V  and  Vd (w, 7) > Vd  (9)
to obtain the remuneration contract that  maximizes total revenue under the ex ante participation
constraints  of the  auditors.
3  Equilibrium  analysis
The preceding section described the  different actors of the economy and  the  way they  interact.
This section determines of the  equilibrium outcome of the overall game by backward induction.
First, the equilibrium of the signaling game is derived under the assumption that  the auditors have
accepted the contract  offered by the  tax agency. Afterwards, the optimal remuneration contract,
solution of the  program  (9), is computed.  If both types  of auditors  accept the contract,  a first
general result that  holds true in this setting is the following:
Proposition  1  At equilibrium, for any report, the corruptible auditors exert a higher effort than
the  honest  ones,  i.e.  ed*(m)  > eh*(m)  \m  E M.
Proof:  From (4) and (6) it is immediate that  b(O,m) -'A\a(9,  m)  > r7u(O,  m). Upon observing
the  report  m,  the  first order condition of the  corruptible  (resp.  honest)  auditors  optimization
program is EM.(b(O,m)  - AOa(O,m)) =  V)'(ed*(m)) (resp.  *7E,'.(u(O,m))  =  4'/(eh*(m))).  For
the  equilibrium to fufll  the consistency requirement, both types of auditors must  hold the same
beliefs a*. Therefore, V)'(ed*(m)) > 0/(eh*(m));  the  result follows directly since  b()  is a  convex
function.  P
This result  is quite intuitive.  Indeed, in determining the  optimal level of effort, the  auditors
equate  the  marginal  cost of effort to  its  expected marginal benefit.  Since corruption  is always
beneficial, the  expected marginal benefit is always higher for the  dishonest auditors.  Therefore,
the  corruptible  auditors  who foresee the  possibility of extra  illegitimate  profit work harder  to
obtain it.
12The characterization  of the  equilibria would constitute  a formidable task  in such a  general
specification.  To get  further  insight on what's  going on,  more restrictions  need to  be  added.
Following most of the  literature  and consistent with existing penalty  systems, the  fine functions
are  restricted  to multiplicative functions of the evaded amount, i.e.,  b(9, m)  =  qju(9,  m), with
qi > 0, for i = a,  t.  The bribe the  evaders have to pay and their expected payoff are then:
b(9,  m)  = 2  ((1-  )(1 + ot)  +  4.Sa + 1)u(09  m)  =  cu(0, m),
and
U(9,  m; eh, ed)  =  0-T()  + {1-(1  +  t)(A + /3(1  -A)eh(m))  - a(l  -/3a,)ed(m)}u(0,  m)
=  9  - T(9)  + -y(m)u(9, m).
At equilibrium,  each  individual is maximizing the  premium  from cheating  given the  auditors'
strategy.  Thus,  no taxpayer  must  gain by  choosing the  report  of another  type.  This  is the
incentive compatibility constraint  found in the literature  of games with asymmetric information.
The incentive compatibility approach to signaling games can be found in Mailath  (1987) or Banks
(1990). One thus obtains the following  condition:
-y(s(0))  . u(9, s(9)) >Ž  y(s(O')) -u(9, s(9'))  V  0,  O' E e.  (10)
At equilibrium, if a 0-type chooses the  action of a  0'-type, the receiver does not perceive it as a
deviation,  but  instead  only assigns the  type  9' to the sender.  A direct implication of condition
(10) above is the  following  proposition (see the appendix for the proof)
Proposition  2  At any equilibrium, the taxpayers' strategy is monotone increasing, i.e., V  9,9' C
e,  0 < O'  implies s(B) < s(9').
This  proposition  merely states  that  richer taxpayers  will report  higher incomes.  The main
difficulty with  signaling games is the  multiplicity of equilibria, which dramatically  reduces the
predictive power of the  models and  thus their  usefulness. The plethora of equilibria is typical in
signaling games. This is because the concept of sequential equilibrium places almost no restrictions
13on the beliefs of the  auditors for reports that  must  not be observed at  a given equilibrium, i.e.,
out-of-equilibrium reports.  The beliefs at such messages can take any conceivable form, and audi-
tors can have some unreasonable beliefs which will generate an infinity of equilibrium outcomes.
Many refinements that  restrict  the out-of-equilibrium beliefs to become reasonable, justifiable or
appropriate  have been proposed in the literature  in order to restore the  predictive power of the
signaling models. The best known are the Never a Weak Best Response by Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986), the Intuitive Criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987) and the Universal Divinity (UD) concept
by Banks and  Sobel (1987).  This latter  will be used in this  paper,  but  the  three  critexia have
been shown to be equivalent in the  type of game dealt  with here, i.e., monotonic games, by Cho
and  Sobel (1990).  UD requires that  for every out-of-equilibrium report  auditors  single out  the
evader that  is the  "most" likely to defect from the equilibrium and put  a probability one on such
a taxpayer.  Fixing s(-), eh(-) and ed(.)  auditors  and taxpayers'  strategies in a sequential equilib-
rium,  let us note by K(6,pls,eh,  ed)  the expected retained  proportion  of the evaded amount  that
makes the  0-taxpayers indifferent between reporting  their  equilibrium report  m  =  s(6) getting
their  expected equilibrium payoff, and making the out-of-equilibrium announcement p:
ic(O,p)  . u(B,p) =  y(m) . u(O,m).  (11)
Suppose the  auditors  adopt  new strategies ed'(.) and  eh'(.)  such that  i(p)  >  r.(O,p), then  the
taxpayer  prefers to defect from the equilibrium by reporting p. For any equilibrium 6 is said to be
more likely  to defect  to p than 6' if ic(0,p)  <  ir(O',p).
Definition  2  A universally divine equilibrium in our game is a sequential equilibrium in  which
for any out-of-equilibrium report p, i'(OIp)  > 0 only if
6 E Argmin  %c(O',P  |  s(-),eh  (),ed)
A zero probability is put on any type of evader breaking the equilibrium as long as there exists
another one who gains more by defecting from the supposed equilibrium. It  is important  to note
that the type most likely to defect can be singled out because we have multiplicative fine functions.
The taxpayers  then  act as if they had  in front of them  an  "average" auditor, where the weights
14are the expected proportion  of the evaded amount lost upon a successful audit by the tax agency,
an honest auditor or a corruptible auditor.
According to proposition 2, the  reporting strategies are increasing monotonically in any equi-
librium.  Any discontinuity in the strategies is thus a jump discontinuity and there  is a countable
number of them since the strategies must also be almost everywhere differentiable. One can thus
expect to have pooling, separating or hybrid equilibria. However, the following  proposition ensures
that  requiring the equilibrium to be universally divine, only separating equilibria, where the type
of the taxpayer  is revealed, survive.
Proposition  3  In  the signaling game played by the taxpayers and the auditors, only separating
equilibria meet the universal divinity requirement.
The proof of this proposition is in the  appendix.  The same type of result is found in Hindriks
(1996) and  Reinganum and Wilde (1986b).
3.1  The  benchmark  cases
Before turning  to the  analysis of the  general game, it is useful to study  the  situation  in which
the auditors  are all honest  (,B  =  1) or all dishonest (,B  = 0).  While the  moral hazard problem is
still relevant, there is no adverse selection in these cases since all the auditors  are alike. Both  the
equilibrium of the  auditors/taxpayers  signaling game and  the  optimal remuneration  scheme are
Vh  - d 
characterized.  It is assumed for the time being that  V  =  V  = 0, i.e., all auditors  have the same
reservation utility normalized at  zero for the  sake of simplicity.
3.1.1  Only  honest  auditors
Suppose first that  all the auditors  are honest  (,3  =  1), i.e., whenever they  discover a cheater, the
latter is denounced.  The expected payoff of an auditor who reviews a file with report  m is given
by (1) to be maximized by eh*(m), while a 0-taxpayer chooses to report m = s*(0) if it maximizes
the expected gain from misreporting
[1-  (1 + Ot)(A + (1-  )eh(m))]u(B,  i).
15It  is straightforward to compute the  first-order conditions of the different players and  derive an
equilibrium that  resembles that  of Reinganum and  Wilde (1986a), where the  audit  probability is
a decreasing function of the  report  which is increasing in true  income.  However, since another
important  purpose of the paper  is to determine the optimal remuneration  scheme, focus will be
placed on simple equilibria,  as the  one derived by Hindricks (1996), characterized  by constant
audit effort and  evasion levels.  Suppose the  auditors  decide to investigate each  report  with an
intensity eh*(i)  _  (l  ,))  Vm c M for all signals. This makes the taxpayers indifferent
with respect to the report  since their expected gain from cheating is constant and equals zero. To
obtain an equilibrium, it is assumed that  the taxpayers adopt the strategy that  is consistent with
that  of the  auditors.  The latter's  expected payoff is maximized at  eh* if the  first order condition
0'(eh*) =,q1E  ,(u(6, m)) holds. Since the equilibrium is separating, the beliefs are point beliefs and
for this condition to hold whatever the  report,  the  evaded amount  must  be constant.  Denoting
this  amount  by uh*, we must  have  uh*  =  7bt(eh*)/19.  It  will be shown that  this  equilibrium is
universally divine and can be sustained by appropriate  beliefs.
In this simple equilibrium, the auditors' strategy is insensitive to both the remuneration  scheme
and the penalty  they face. The commission rate  x7  affects only the evasion decision, higher values
implying less evasion. From a report  m, the inspectors in charge of such a file expect a payoff of
w + 77T(m)  + 77eh*uh*  - ib(eh*). The overall expected payoff from the contract  (w, 7) is given by
Vh  = w +  7T-  (1-eh*)7uh*  -O(eh*),
while the tax  agency expects to collect an amount of tax  cum fines of
R,h* =  (1-i7)T-w-((1-  A)(1 + Ot) - )(1-e*)u*  + ftu*
where T  fe  T(8)f(9)dg  is the average true tax  liability. What type of contract  will the  agency
propose to the auditors in order to maximize the collected amount?  It is useful to rewrite the tax
agency revenue as a function of the auditors'  effort and utility, the following way
h  =  T - (eh  )
16This  expression makes clear  that  both  the  effort exerted  by the  auditors  and  the  utility  they
derive from a given contract are wasteful for the agency. A straightforward consequence is that  no
rent should be left to the employees, and the  tax  agency must propose a contract  that  will make
the participation  constraint binding.  For any  1 >  i7 > 0, it suffices to propose  wh*(71) such that
Vh*  0. A straightforward computation gives:
e~~~~~~~~~~~~b
wh*(v)  = j  (1 - e)iP"(e)de - qT.  (12)
It  may well be that  wh(ii)  <  0,  meaning that  the  inspectors must  pay  for the  right  to collect
taxes.  The optimal fixed wage to be paid depends on the commission rate only through  the size
of the  tax  base.  The higher the  tax  base the  lower the  wage.  The tax  agency always collects
Zh*  = T - ,(eh*),  the sole leakage with respect to the  no-evasion case is the transfer that  has to
be given to the  auditors to compensate them for the disutility of effort.
3.1.2  Only  dishonest  auditors
Suppose now that  ,B  =  0, i.e., all the  auditors are  prone to  corruption whenever it is financially
beneficial. The focus will again be on simple equilibria. For the taxpayers to be indifferent about
the  report  they  make the  probability  of an  audit  must  be  ed*(M)  =  (1-  A(1  + Ot))/a  Vm E
M.2 Unlike the  honest auditors, the corruptible  ones choose their  effort level depending on the
remuneration  scheme and  the  penalty  system.  The auditing  effort is decreasing with both  the
commission and the  penalty  rates,  i.e., 49ed*/&/q  <  0 and  8ed*/lao  < 0.  For this  strategy  to be
an equilibrium strategy, the taxpayers  must all evade the  same amount ud* = VP'(ed*)/(a _ AO.).
Since corruption is profitable, it always takes place when an audit  provides compelling evidence
2 Recall that  the  audit  effort is also a probability,  so to keep things  within bounds,  some restrictions  need to  be
added.  It  is easy to  see that  the  condition  we need  for 0 <  ed,  < 1 is
1- 7?- A('  + 0a)  S  S1  A A,
I  - Ot  A
One can plot  in the  space (Ot, qt)  the set in  which that  condition  is satisfied.  The remainder  of the paper  assumes
that  the  punishment  rates  belong to  this set,  denoted  P.
17of evasion. The overall expected payoff of an auditor from a contract  (w, 77)  is then
V'  =  w + qT - (77  - (a - . )ed*)ud* -(ed*)
while the tax  agency expects to collect
Rd*  =  (1-  i)T-w-((1-  A)(1 + qt)-  -A1-  ed)ud* +  ptud*
=  T - i(ed*)  _Vd*
in taxes and fines. As in the preceding case, effort and rent are costly to the agency which must
offer its employees a contract  that  will leave them no rent equalizing their expected payoff to the
value of their  outside option.  For a  given commission rate  i7, there  exists a  fixed wage wd*(77)
such that  the utility of the auditors is V,d* -=  0 and the agency collects Rd*  =  T - ,(ed*).  Again,
the  loss in tax  collection corresponds to the  amount that  must  be paid  to the  auditors  for the
compensation of the audit effort's disutility. Notice that the revenue collected is lower  with respect
to the case of honest auditors, since the dishonest ones work harder.  It is easy to compute as
d*(71)  = Jo  (  A  - e) 4"'(e)de  - i7T.  (13)
Whether  the auditors  are all honest or all dishonest, the tax  agency offers a  contract  such that
for any commission the  fixed wage is such that  no rent is left  to the  auditors.  If the  auditors
are honest, all remuneration  contracts provide the same revenue because the effort level is fixed.
However, when the auditors are corruptible, the monitoring effort, which determines the leakage in
revenue collected, depends on the commission rate.  Therefore all the remuneration contracts  are
not equivalent, unlike the full-honesty case. It is clear from the expression above that  the revenue
collected is a decreasing function of the effort exerted by the auditors, which is a decreasing function
of the  commission rate.  Therefore, the  unique optimal remuneration  contract  is (1,  wd*(1)),  i.e.,
a commission of 100 percent  associated with  the  fixed part  which leads to  full rent  extraction
Vd  -0.  The tax  agency therefore  "privatizes" the  collection of taxes;  the revenue-maximizing
system when all auditors  are corruptible is the pure tax-farming system.
18The discussion in the last two sections can be subsumed in the following  proposition:
Proposition  4  if all the tax inspectors are identical, the tax agency offers a remuneration contract
(￿, w￿(i￿))  for i  =  h, d such that:
(a) the auditors accept the contract;
(b) a triple (Si*(.),  ei*(.),j. 6i*(.))  that is a universally divine sequential equ￿lib￿ium  is the outcome
of the signaling game played by the taxpayers and auditors, with
￿  s"(9)  T1 (T(6)  - ui*) for all 9 E 8  and u￿  > Q￿
(ii) ei*(m)  ei* for all mE  M,  and 0 <  ei* < ￿;
(iii)  ￿￿￿(8￿m)  1 for m  =  si*(O), ,￿ji*(￿jp)  =  1 for p  <  si*(Q) and pi*(￿jp)  =  1 for
p>  si*(￿)
(c) if the auditors are honest, all the contracts (tj, wh*(￿))  are equivalent;
(d) if the auditors are dishonest pure tax farming (I, wd*(1)) is the unique  revenue maximizing
contract;
(e) the revenue collected is greater when auditors are honest.
F￿ill  rent extraction is possible in these benchmark cases because the tax agency has complete
information with respect to the integrity of its employees. The next section focuses on the  case
where this  no longer holds.
3.2  Heterogeneous  iuspectors
Let us now turn  to the more interesting situation where the proportion of honest auditors working
in the  tax  agency is 0 <fi  <1.  The auditors  are indistinguishable and  only one remuneration
contract is offered. The tax agency suffers now from information asynunetries. To derive the same
type of simple equilibria, the taxpayers have to be indifferent, as in the preceding section, about
the  report to make. The audit probabilities must then be such that  'y(m)  0. More importantly
at such an equilibrium ￿  and e'￿  that  satisfy this  condition must also be constant,  Indeed, the
condition could hold while 8e￿/8m  <  0  <ae)/am  for i, j  =  h, d and  i ￿  j. However, from the
first order conditions, the  audit  probabilities depend on the  evaded amount and  at  equilibrium
the  auditors have the  same beliefs, therefore the audit  intensities must be either both increasing
or both  decreasing.  In  the  (eh,  ed)  plane, the  equation 7(m)  0 is defined by a line pivoting
around  (eh*, e￿),  having a slope of ￿  (1A)￿1+￿)  which depends on the relative number of
19honest to dishonest auditors  and the different parameters of the model (see figure 2).  The first-
order conditions for the honest and dishonest auditors are respectively  t'(eh)  = 1E,(u(9,  m)) and
V,'(ed)  =  (a - A,)EM,(u(6,  m)). The beliefs  are point beliefs  and for these  conditions  to hold the
evaded amounts must be independent of the income, and  we denote the constant evaded amount
by ii. For a given (A,  O., ot, /)  vector of parameters,  denoted by
(1)=  {((eh,ed),0  < eh, ed < 1;  such that  V,)(ed)  =  0a'(e)
and by
r(7)  ={((eh,  ed), O <  eh, ed < 1;  such that  y = 0}.
The equilibrium audit efforts pair is determined by the intersection of these two sets, i.e., (eh(77),  e(77))  =
T(i7) n r(77).  The set of equilibria is obtained by varying 7 in the interval [0,1]. It is straightfor-
ward to show that  for a given set of parameters, there  exists a unique  intersection point,  that
is a unique equilibrium.  This equilibrium will be studied with reference to the benchmark cases.
For a given 77,  the equilibrium that  arises in each of the latter cases has already been established.
If the same commission rate is adopted by the  tax agency in the case of a mixture of honest and
dishonest auditors, two cases must  be considered depending on whether  the  parameters  of the
model imply uh* Z  ud*.
Case  1:  u  h* >  u'  the evasion is greater when all auditors  are honest.  Suppose that  eh  >
eh*  then,  to satisfy -y  0, it is necessary that  ed  <  ed*.  However,  uh*  >  ud*  >  i,L/(ed*)  <
QA  Ip(eh*)  thus an increase in the level of effort of the honest auditors and a decrease in that  of
the dishonest ones cannot satisfy the conditions. Hence if uh*  > ud*  then  eh < eh* and ed  >  ed*.
Case  2:  uh* <  ud* the evasion  is greater when all auditors are dishonest. The same reasoning
shows that  if uh*  < ud*  then  eh  >  e  h* and ed  <  ed*.
Using the same arguments, it is easy to show that the equilibrium level of evasion  is in between
that  of the  two extreme cases, i.e., ui E (ui*,  ui")  for i, j  =  h, d  and i = j.  It must be noted that
in case 1, one may encounter a non-existence of equilibrium problem.  This comes from the fact
20that  for some values of the parameters, one could have Ed > 1 while this never happens in case 2.
Indeed, in this latter  case, the equilibrium effort pair lies in the  triangle ABC in figure 2, while
in case 1 it is at  the north-west of point A. For high Ps one could thus have no equilibrium since
the audit  effort required from the  dishonest auditors is too high.  Thus, in the  remainder of this
paper, only case 2 is considered, the results being symmetric for case 1 whenever an equilibrium
exists. At this equilibrium, taxpayers evade less than  if there were only dishonest auditors.
ed
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Figure 2. Equilibrium for 1'  #13  and (A,  Xc,  q7, 7) fixed.
The tax agency anticipates the equilibrium that will arise depending on the contract proposed
to the  auditors.  It  will choose this  contract  to maximize the  revenue collected.  The auditors'
expected payoff from a common contract  (w, i7)  is
Vh = w + 7T-(1_eh)1U-_(ph)
for the honest ones and
Vd =  w +  tT  - ('i  - (a  -A4,,)e)u-  (e)
for the corruptible ones. This shows that  Vd  > V.,  i.e., the corruptible auditors'  payoff is larger
than  that  of the honest ones.  In fact, the  following  relationship between the  auditors'  utility  is
21readily derived 3
-vd  - h  p
V  =Ve  +  |  eb"(e)de,
e  eh
where the integral term  is the extra utility the corruptible inspectors get; it is the informational
rent of dishonesty. This is quite intuitive since the dishonest auditors always have the option to
behave honestly. The tax agency collects  the  following  revenue in taxes and fines
7Z=(1  - 7)T -[((1-  A)(1  + Ot) - i)(1  -de)  )-  A(l -(3)0,,e  d  t]af
=  T-/3[O()h)+Ve1  -(1-/3)  _  (d) + V$
Again, the  effort exerted  by the  inspectors and  the  rent they  are  left with  are  costly to  the
tax  agency.  Which remuneration  scheme provides the  greater tax  cum fines collection?  Both
honest and dishonest auditors'  participation constraints  have to be respected in order to have an
equilibrium. It is clear that  to maximize the revenue no rent should be left to the honest auditors.
-h  ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  - Indeed, for x7  fixed, if w is such that  at the  equilibrium V,  > O  it is possible to propose w' <  w}
such that  V5 =  0 that  is accepted by all the auditors without changing the  equilibrium outcome
and increase the revenue raised. The tax agency is bound to leave a rent to the dishonest auditors,
i.e., Vd  > 0 since otherwise the honest ones would not participate  in the audit  game and upset
the equilibrium. For a given commission  rate  iq, the optimal fixed  wage is thus W(71)  that  saturates
the honest auditors'  participation constraint  and is given by
T(rq)  _ J  (1 -e)Of"(e)de -7T.  (14)
It has the  same structure  as the case ,B  = 1 except that  now the effort depends on the commission
rate since it is linked with the effort exerted by the  dishonest auditors.  The expected payoff of
the honest  auditors is equated to their  outside option whereas the  corruptible agents enjoy the
3 The  argument  runs  as follows:  from the  fo.c.  and  the  separating  property  of the  equilibrium,  one  obtains
,P'(eh)  =  isu  1  and  )  =  (a  A-0 )t.  Afterwards,  an easy  computationi  Vd _ VI an  - n  as  omuttingives  V 
[ip'(-h)gh  _  (ph)]  =  f$  e7"(e)de  >  0 since  i,  is  convex.
22informational rent of dishonesty. The expected revenue accruing to the tax  agency is therefore
R. = T  - &i,(gh)  - (1-  ,3) [f(Ed)  + I e/"(e)dej  (15)
where  for any  commission rate  no rent is left to  the  honest inspectors.  The revenue loss with
respect  to the full tax  liability then amounts to the compensation of disutility of effort for all the
auditors and the informational rent that  has to be left to the corruptible agents only. The overall
optimal remuneration  scheme is the one that  minimizes this  loss. It remains to characterize the
optimal commission rate which is the solution of the  following  program:
i1 E Argmin L(71)  =  pj4(eh(71))  + (1 - f)aI4d(t7)) + (1 -13) |  e"e.  (6 ~~~EArgmin  ~~~~~~~~~eaP"(e)de.  (16)
There  is no  problem of existence since the  loss function is continuous and  is minimized on  a
compact interval.  Even though the first-order condition is readily computed, it is of almost no use
because the expressions involved in this condition are rather complicated and identifying the local
minima is impossible within such a general framework. However,  the  tax agency can compute the
loss function for a fixed set of parameters  and then determine the  optimal commission rate.  This
expression does not allow for establishing a unique optimal commission rate,  but the  important
fact is that  in case of multiple solutions the  collected revenue is the same and the  tax  agency is
indifferent.  To break the  tie it is assumed  that  the  agency chooses the  contract  that  gives the
higher payoff to the  agents.  All the  parameters,  the  distribution  of types /3, the  penalty  system
(O'., Ot), and the  probability of discovering the  conspiracy A play important  roles on the optimal
remuneration  contract.
Proposition  5  If the population of tax inspectors is heterogeneous, the tax agency offers a single
remuneration  contract  (ii,  W(71))  such that:
(a) the auditors accept the contract;
(b)  a  quadruple  (F(.  )h(.),  SQ) j2(.))  that  is  a universally  divine  sequential  equilibrium  is  the
outcome of the signaling game played by the taxpayers and  auditors, with
(i) s(O) = T-1 (T(O) - 5) for all 0 E e  and ui  > 0;
(ii)  eh(m)  =  eh,  gd(m)  =  ed for all m  E M,  and O <Eh  <ed  <  j;
23(iii) Tt(Olm)  = 1 for m = s(9), ji(91p)  = 1 for p < g(g) and i2(8Ip)  = 1  for p > 9(T);
(c) the revenue maximizing contracts are (F7,  w(r-)) where the commission rates are given by (16);
they yield the same revenue;
(d) the selected contract leaves no rent to the honest inspectors and a strictly positive rent to the
corruptible inspectors.
4  Some  possible  extensions
In this  section we examine the effect on the  equilibrium outcome of relaxing some assumptions
that  have been made implicitly or explicitly.
Ex post  participation  constraint
By writing the participation constraint of the auditors in ex ante terms, an implicit assumption in
the analyses performed up to now is that  the auditors can commit once hired to audit all reports
with the  equilibrium audit  intensity. This is however a very strong  assumption since ex post,  for
some low-income reports,  the  auditors  have no incentive to audit  (that  intensively) anticipating
that  for the fixed wage paid these files will bring a negative payoff. The lack of commitment power
can overturn the equilibrium. We suppose now that the auditors cannot (in fact have no incentive
to)  commit to audit  all the  files.  The participation  constraint  then  has  to be  satisfied for any
report.4 Formally, this condition can be written  as
w + rT(m) + i7eh(m)lEP(u(8,  m))  - ,(eh(m))  >  0  Vm E  M
for the  honest auditors  and
wo  + 27T(m)  + (a - AOa)ed(m)E.(u(O, m))  -_  (eh(M))  >  0  Vm s  M
for the corruptible ones. These equations must hold for any considered equilibrium.  For the simple
equilibria we are  interested in here, they  will be simplified.  Indeed, since the  evasion levels are
the  same, it is enough that  the constraints  be fulfilled and  binding for the  lower report  in the
4  This  is  also  a kind  of  limited  liability  constraint  that  has  to  be  respected  for  any  state  of  the  nature  (file  to
audit  here), not  only  on average.
24different scenarios considered. The necessity of taking into account the ex post incentives for the
auditors to inspect translates  into a cost for the tax agency. Indeed, by inducing the  auditors to
commit ex ante, the tax  agency is shifting all the risk on the shoulders of these latter who on any
report m bear a risk of 77(T(O)  - T), where 0 is the true income of the taxpayers reporting m. One
clearly sees that  on average the risk is zero and the  auditors are induced to sign the contract  ex
ante.  However, the auditors loose money ex post (if they audit)  on all taxpayers whose income is
below the mean.  Now if the auditors refuse to bear this risk, the agency must pay them enough to
audit all reports.  One can then show that  the cost, for the tax agency, of the lack of commitment
from the  inspectors to the  audit  strategy is independent of the  distribution  of honest/dishonest
inspectors and equal to  CNC  =  rl(T - T(9). For a given commission rate,  the fixed wage has to
be  set such that  the inspector gains to audit  the report,  whatever it is.  Since only equilibria in
which the  evasion level (audit  effort) is independent of the  true  income (reported income) are
investigated here, we must have
w + 77(T(6)  - u) + 7e'u-  Ob(eh)  c  0
for the  honest  auditor  and  the  analogous expression for the  corruptible  ones.  The fixed wage
is computed from the  above equation and  the difference between it and  the  one that  has to be
paid in the commitment case gives the cost of impossibility of commitment.  Repeating the same
operations for all the scenarios shows  that it is always the same and independent of the distribution
of the  auditors' types in the pool.
The introduction of ex post individual rationality constraints has very important  implications
for the optimal remuneration scheme, since the cost it induces directly relates to the comnission
rate.  When all the auditors are honest (,3 = 1), we have already shown that  from an ex ante point
of view, the  rate  is irrelevant since the same tax  revenue can be  achieved for any of its  possible
values by adjusting the fixed wage. Now, the  rate must be taken into account since higher rates
imply higher costs to be borne,  and less revenue.  The optimal remuneration  scheme is in this
25case the  pure wage system which sets rq  =  0. We do not consider this  possibility in our  model,
then x7  will be fixed at its lowest possible (maybe chosen by a regulatory agency) level. If on the
other hand the  auditors are all corruptible (,l = 0), the tax  agency faces a trade-off between the
cost stemming from the lack of commitment power and those induced by a high level of auditing
effort due to  low commission rates.  One can write the  revenue in the  no-commitment case as
1ZNdc  = T - ,(ed*)  - q(T - T(f).  The optimal commission rate is
77nc  =  Arg minM  (eI  (77)) + rj(T  - T(fl)).
The first-order condition is easily derived and the optimal rate is such that the marginal benefit of
reducing 17,  (T - T(#)  stemming from the reducing of the no-commitment cost equals its marginal
cost, [1 - A(1 + .t)],0t(ed*(T7))/2a 2 stemming from the increase in effort that  must be monetarily
compensated.  Taking into account ex post incentives, the  tax  agency switches from a pure tax-
farming system to an intermediate system if the  solution to the  above minimization program is
interior and a pure wage system otherwise.
In  the  case 0 <  ,B <  1 the  results  are harder to  obtain since the  optimal commission rate
has not  been fully characterized.  The tax agency still faces the  same trade-off between the  cost
induced by the  loss function and that  of no-commitment.  One can however show that  the latter
cost reduces the level of the previous commission rate,  i.e., fn  <  7  with
=  Arg min L(iq)  + q(T  - T(f)).  (17)
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Indeed, either both are corner solutions, i.e. fi  =  0, and i  0  0, or ij > 0 and the introduction of
a new cost that  is linearly increasing in the commission rate  forcefully leads to  ,c < 
Integrity-dependent  reservation  utility
Since the  inspectors are alike except for the  integrity parameter,  it is reasonable to assume, as
we did, that  they have the same set of opportunities outside the  tax agency. However, does this
imply that  they  have the same reservation utility?  It  could be that  the  corruptible agents can
26take an  advantage from their  dishonesty for any other job,  as they  do in the  agency, and thus
have greater reservation utilities than  the  honest ones.  In any case, it is assumed now that  the
inspectors have type-dependent reservation utilities.  Denote by V'  > 0 for i =  h, d the outside
options.  In the cases 6 =  1 or ,  = 0, the tax  agency takes into account this  rent to be paid and
increases the  fixed wage by the value of the new reservation utility.  The only thing that  changes
is the revenue collected, which is lowered. At equilibrium, the optimal remuneration  schemes are
the  same and this  holds for both commitment and no-commitment cases.
The interesting case is 0 < /1  < 1 when a mix of auditors are hired. Changing the reservation
utility has no effect  on the optimal commission rate since it is sufficient to increase the fixed wage
until  all participation constraints are met. The fixed wage being essentially a lump-sum transfer,
this  operation  does not  affect the  equilibrium, except  for the  revenue collected.  The relevant
question for the tax agency is whether the difference  in reservation utilities V = V  -Vh  is greater,
equal or less than  the  informational rent the  dishonest auditors  enjoy at  the  equilibrium where
outside options are alike, IR  = ft,, eVi"(e)de.  Since the participation constraint of the honest is still
required, the fixed wage has to be increased at least by Vh. If V = IR, then by increasing the fixed
wage by exactly Vh both the honest and dishonest auditors' individual rationality constraints are
binding and the tax agency loses nothing more. In this case, the corruptible inspectors lose their
informational rent since the gap between the reservation utilities has been used as a substitute  for
it.  If V  < IR,  then the honest agents' participation constraint  is binding and the dishonest still
receive a smaller rent since they lose part,  and exactly V, of their rent.  If V > IR,  then  giving Vh
is not enough to meet the  participation constraint of the corruptible, the  tax  agency must then
increase the  fixed wage by Vh + 6 such that  V  + 6 + IR  = V  . Now the  honest agents enjoy
an  informational rent since their  utility  is higher than  their outside option, by 6, while for the
dishonest one the  constraint is binding. In conclusion, when the reservation utilities are different,
the tax agency uses the gap as a perfect substitute  for the informational rent that  had to be given
to the dishonest auditors  who lose in this situation, the  winners being the  honest agents who in
27some situations  earn more than  expected. The greater V, the better  off they are.
The  employment  contract  as  a signal
Up to  now, we have considered the  tax  agency's revenue maxinization  problem as  an ex post
problem  since the maximization is done under the  constraint  that  the  staff is already  in place
and  all the  auditors  have to participate.  It  could be the  case that  the  agency does not  desire
corrupt  (or honest)  individuals on its staff and could thus propose a  contract that  would allow
for screening the  auditors who self select according to the  contract proposed.  In fact,  it is more
realistic to  think that  in order to hire the  inspectors, the  agency has  to propose, to a  pool of
skilled but unemployed auditors, a contract that  is publicly observed ex ante.  Those who are then
interested will apply for employment. This is important  since it conditions the equilibrium that
will arise. Indeed, the public contract constitutes a signal for the taxpayers.  Upon the proposal of
the contract, one can infer which type of auditors it will attract.  It is important  to notice that  in
our model, the argument according to which efficiency  wage deters corruption does not have any
bite.  In fact,  corruption in this context  depends only on equation  (4); as long as  (4) is satisfied
the  corruptible inspectors and  the  evaders will collude whenever they  meet,  irrespective of the
remuneration scheme. Corruption is thus "structural"  and  depends on the penalty  system.
A direct implication is that no contract exists that  will attract  only honest agents.  Whenever
the honest agents are attracted  by a contract, it also attracts  the dishonest.  The adverse selection
problem is quite harsh.  On the other hand, there are contracts that  will attract  corruptible agents
and repel honest  ones. 5 The set of contracts can be represented in the  space (w, 7i) which is
partitioned  into three  regions:
(a) {(w(r),r7),  such that  w(77)  > -0(1)};
(b) {(w(ii),i7),  such that  wd(n) < w(77)  < T(7)};
S  Note here the  analogy  with  the theory  of insurance  with  adverse selection where any pooling contract,  as the
one proposed  here  (abstracting  from the  budget  balance constraint),  leads to  an equilibrium  with  either  only bad
risk agents  or both  types  accepting  the contract.  We dc consider  here neither  the  possibilty  nor  the optimality  of
offering different employment  contracts  that  will induce  the collectors  to  self select.
28(c)  {(w(tI),i,),  such that w(ii)  < wud(i)}.
Recall that  W(71)  is the fixed wage that  makes the  honest auditors'  participation  constraint
binding if the agency staff is mixed, and wd(n)  is the one that just  induces the corruptible agents
to accept the  contract  when ,B =  0. The contracts that  belong to  region (a) attract  both  the
honest and the corruptible agents, in region (b) only dishonest auditors will apply for employment
while nobody is willing to work for contracts that  lie in  (c).  The latter  contracts  can never be
optimal for the tax  agency because they  imply too much evasion. Even though the  distribution
of the pool is (,6,1 -o3), the distribution of the auditors hired by the tax agency is endogenous to
the  contract offered and the agency has the choice between (,3,  1-  /3) where the contract attracts
both types of auditors and (0,1) that only attract  dishonest auditors.  One can show that  in case 1
U(n)  >  wd(77)  for allq  E [0,  1]. We have been unable to show it for case 2. If this condition were not
to be satisfied in a region, then the agency loses the choice since in this region any wage attracting
the dishonest auditors also attracts the honest ones. The tax agency now chooses  the contract that
will bring the highest expected revenue. At this end, it needs to compare the contracts in region
(a) to those in region (b) and select the optimal one. For a given commission rate  -q  the agency
will offer U(i7) if L(i 1 ) < ,(ed*(q)  and w1d(q) otherwise. Surprisingly, there may be cases in which
the tax  agency does not want to hire honest auditors.  The reason for this counterintuitive result
is the following. Even though an honest inspector brings, in expected terms, more revenue than
a dishonest one, because they denounce the cheaters, mixing them with the  dishonest creates the
adverse selection problem. The tax agency can thus prefer to offer contracts that  will attract  only
the dishonest auditors, eliminating by the same token the  adverse selection problem. This latter
being suppressed, the moral hazard problem can be  handled more efficiently and the  contracts
will be chosen to  leave no costly rents to the dishonest.  This is a  kind of capitulation  wage as
proposed by Besley and McLaren (1993); however,  the argument is much more complex.
Let us now show that W(71) > wd(,q)  in case 1. Using equations (12) and (14) and the first-order
29conditions in the different contexts, we have
(v)-  Wd(ui)  =  -(ii  - ud*)  +  X  eO,h(e)de,
in case 1, the first expression is positive while the  second one is always positive since as shown
earlier ed*(Qq) >  g'(ij)  for all q. In case 2, one must compare these two expressions and depending
on which one dominates the  analysis may or may not hold.
5  Concluding  remarks
The main purpose of this paper has  been to analyze the  problem of a tax  agency that  wants to
maximize its tax receipts in an environment where corruption is pervasive. The tax  agency needs
to  employ inspectors to audit  taxpayers  and  collect taxes.  Inspectors can  be either  honest or
dishonest and the only way the agency can influence their behavior is through the remuneration
contract it offers. It transpires from the analysis that when all inspectors are prone to corruption
pure tax-farming is the unique revenue maximizing contract  whereas all contracts are equivalent
when auditors are all honest.  If in contrast the  population of inspectors comprises both honest
and  dishonest inspectors, the  tax  agency has  to propose a  contract  that  lies between pure  tax-
farming and pure wage contract.  For any chosen commission rate,  the fixed wage component of
the contract must be adjusted to extract  all the rent of the honest tax  inspectors. In the presence
of honest  auditors,  the  agency is unable to  extract  the  rent  of its  corruptible  agents.  When
the  tax  administration  has  the possibility to  offer screening remuneration  contracts  during  the
hiring process, it may be optimal to offer capitulation wage contracts that  attract  only corruptible
auditors.  As surprising as it  might seem, this result  is rooted in a firm intuition.  Indeed, the
tax  agency is facing a moral hazard as well as an adverse selection problem; a capitulation  wage
offer evacuates the  latter  problem and deals efficiently with the  remaining moral  hazard issue
afterwards.
There are a number of directions in which this work can be fruitfully extended.  First, while
30it  is reasonable to  assume different degrees of integrity  within the  population  of auditors,  to
assume all taxpayers  are dishonest seems artificial.  A more satisfactory model would also allow
a  fraction of taxpayers to be inherently honest following Erard  and Feinstein (1994).  However,
this seemingly minor change dramatically complicates the model. The first important implication
of the  introduction of honest taxpayers is the unsustainability  of simple equilibria with constant
evasion amount (for dishonest taxpayers) and constant audit probability.  Indeed, suppose instead
an  equilibrium with eh(m)  =  eh and  Ed(m) =  ed implying -y(m) =  -y >  0 Vm E M.  All the
dishonest taxpayers will then  evade the  same amount  ui and  the wealthiest dishonest taxpayer
reports mn  = T'1(T(O)  - ii) while the honest 0-taxpayer with 0 E [m,  0] report truthfully.  For such
reports,  since there is no gain in auditing, all the inspectors want to reduce the  audit probability
to zero. In anticipation, some high-income dishonest taxpayers will report in the  above interval
upsetting the  equilibrium.  This simple reasoning holds for any constant  audit  function.  The
incorporation of honest taxpayers forces us to study more complex equilibria of the type derived
by Reinganum and Wilde (1986a) or Erard  and Feinstein(1994) with decreasing audit  functions.
This renders the  analysis of the optimal remuneration scheme a formidable task.  We leave this
question open for future research.
Another interesting extension would be to consider the whole four-tier hierarchy by considering
an  active government that  chooses the income tax  schedule and penalty  system to maximize its
objective function. However, the government and the tax agency may have conflicting objectives,
the  former aiming at  maximizing social welfare and the  latter  caring only about  tax  revenues.
Such problems are dealt  with in Cremer et  al.  (1990) and  Sanchez and  Sobel (1993).  These
papers do not however consider the corruption problem. This will also raise the problem of the
distributional  impact of evasion cum corruption, and the government will have to carefully choose
the tax schedule in order to achieve its objective. As we have shown, the  tax agency's resources
are greater when the penalty system supports the eradication of corruption, which could also lead
to a higher social welfare. However,  one can easily imagine situations in which it is optimal from
31a  social welfare perspective to allow some corruption  in order  to increase the  well-being of the
auditors  or to impose some restrictions on the remuneration scheme such as the non-negativity of
the fixed wage, precluding by the same token its abusive use by the tax agency as an instrument
for the  extraction of the inspectors'  rent.
Finally, it has been assumed that  costs of appeal  to a  court are so low that  there  is no fear
of extortion.  However, there  is compelling evidence that  such practices exist especially in the
developing countries where  taxpayers  are often victims  of harassment  from the  inspectors,  see
Klitgaard  (1988)  and Hindriks et al. (1999). The latter formally introduce extortion in their model
as the possibility for the inspector to unilaterally overstate a taxpayer's  liability. Tax farming has
appeared to be optimal in some situations in this paper.  It would be interesting to see whether this
result is overturned once extortion is possible, because of a weak judiciary system, and because the
government cares about  the well-being of the  individuals.  The latter  must be  protected  against
overzealous inspectors, and this is costly since the planner has to engage resources to monitor the
inspectors'  behavior as argued by Stella (1993).
32Appendix
Proof of proposition 2:
The same line of proof as that  in Banks  (1990) is followed. The honest taxpayers' strategy  is trivially
monotone increasing since sh(0) =  9. Suppose that  5 d (.)  is not monotone increasing, so that  30, 9' such
that  6  <  ' but  sd(9) > dd(O%),  since overreporting is never optimal we have 0 >  sd(6). One can rewrite
(10) as
y_S>__  u(- ,s  (6'))
Differentiating the rhs of this expression while holding sd(0) and  Sd(0 :)  constant  gives
Lq[  ]  aUMes  (9  ))  . U(6,  Sd (o))-  (89()'U,S  )
as- 8 ,.(O,ad(Gl)"  ,d  u(6, Sd(0l))
By the properties  of the function u(,  .), the numerator is negative while the denominator  is positive.  The
rhs of our rewritten  incentive compatibility condition is thus decreasing with 0. It  then implies that
s d (O))  >  u(0, 
5 d(
6 ))  >  u(O',  5 d( 6 1))
7y(sd(0') - u(f, sd(6))  u(6', sd(e))
which in turn  implies that  -y(sd(0))u(0I,sd( 6))  > _Y(sd(0I))u(0I, 8d(61)) contradicting  the assumption that
sd(.) is an equilibrium strategy.  d
Proof  of  proposition  3:  The objective is to show how the universal divinity criterion of Banks and
Sobel eliminates all pooling and partially  pooling equilibria of the  game.  Let us first identify the type
most likely to defect from a given equilibrium with reporting strategy  s(-). We have
rK(O,pis'(-),  e'(-), e  d())  7(d(o)).(6  ;d(o))
u(61,  p))
where p is the out-of-equilibrium report  observed.  Differentiating this expression with respect to 6, one
obtains:
I  _  [Y(Sd(0))U(,  Sd(9))]  _(6,p)_-_(Sd(8))U(  5Sd(o))&u,P)
a8  u
2(0,p)
_,(Sd())  u(9  d(e9))U(O lp) - OUQ)  U(6,  Sd (6)]
u2(f, p)
Y(sd(6))&u/O6  [u(6, p)  - u(6,  sd(6))]
The first term  in the  numerator  of the  first equation  is simplified by the  fact that  at  equilibrium the
strategy  is incentive compatible.  The  last  equation  is derived from the  second by making  use of  the
properties  of the  function u(.,-)  which is separable.  The  sign of the  derivative allows to identify the
type  most likely to defect to p and depends  on the position of p.  Suppose first that  the  equilibrium is
pooling,  i.e., all the  taxpayers  adopt  the strategy  sd (6) =  m  V 6 E e  to which the auditors  respond
by constant  audit  efforts ed' and eh* resulting  in the constant  expected saved proportion of the amount
33evaded  f*. For this pooled message to be an equilibrium it must satisfy m  <  a  since overreporting  is
never optimal.  Let p be an out-of-equilibrium message, OiK/8O  is negative  (resp. positive), the type most
likely to defect is 8 (resp.  0) and universal divinity requires g(OIp)  =  I (reSp.  M(Rlp)  =  1) for p greater
(resp.  less) than  m*.  Suppose the  0-taxpayer chooses to separate  by sending the message m =  m-e
for e positive  and small.  She then  evades a little  bit more but  still less than  the pooled average.  Both
the honest and corruptible auditors expected gain from auditing  m is lower than  that  from auditing m*,
hence the separating  taxpayer faces a lower probability  and a higher expected payoff(for e small enough)
and will thus separate and break the pooling equilibrium. Repeating the same argument, the semi-pooling
equilibria are also eliminated.  U
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